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ABSTRACT 
 Local law enforcement is expected to respond to cybercrimes by having the 
appropriate level of capabilities and capacity for highly technical and complex 
investigative activities. Having the specialized resources necessary to have this type of 
investigative capability and capacity presents significant challenges for local law 
enforcement agencies regardless of size. Small and midsize agencies face even greater 
challenges based on a lack of necessary resources, ranging from trained personnel to 
funding. Adding to the list challenges is a lack of standardization, policies, and protocols 
to provide guidance to agencies looking for strategies to address the need for cybercrime 
investigative capabilities and capacity. This thesis examined different models being used 
by local law enforcement agencies of all sizes to address the need for cybercrime 
investigative capabilities and capacity and lumped them into three models: internal 
resources, conventional task forces, and hybrid task forces. Using strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities, threats (SWOT) analysis, the three models were examined. The findings 
revealed commonalities and differences between the models, highlighting potential pros 
and cons for each. Recommendations were made for local law enforcement decision 
makers to consider when developing policies and protocols around their need for 
cybercrime investigative capabilities and capacity. 
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The over 18,000 U.S. local law enforcement agencies are expected to enforce laws 
and investigate crimes; cybercrime is no exception. According to data from the Internet 
Crime Complaint Center (IC3), which only accounts for some of the reported cybercrimes, 
cybercrimes continue to proliferate. As indicated in the first page of the U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security Cybersecurity Strategy, securing this nation’s cyberspace is a 
homeland security responsibility shared between local, state, and federal law enforcement 
agencies. It is not just about the prevention of crimes in cyberspace; it also includes 
disrupting cybercrime and holding cybercriminals accountable. Contrary to the popular 
belief that investigating cybercrimes is only the responsibility of federal law enforcement 
agencies, local enforcement agencies are on the frontlines of the fight against cybercrime.1 
With the majority of local law enforcement agencies in the United States being small in 
size, and having limited cybercrime investigative capabilities, cybercrime-related 
enforcement efforts can be a daunting task.2 Regardless of the challenges, local law 
enforcement must have the ability to deal with cybercrime.  
The challenges associated with cybercrime investigative activities for local law 
enforcement agencies run the gamut. No national standard for expectations exists on the 
level of cybercrime capabilities and capacity local law enforcement agencies should have 
and a lack of policies and protocols to guide the response to and training in cybercrime-
related topics.3 Local law enforcement agencies’ current strategies for addressing 
 
1 Chuck Wexler, The Role of Local Law Enforcement Agencies in Preventing and Investigating 
Cybercrime (Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum, 2014), 2, https://www.policeforum.org/
assets/docs/Critical_Issues_Series_2/the%20role%20of%20local%20law%20enforcement%20agencies%
20in%20preventing%20and%20investigating%20cybercrime%202014.pdf; Thomas J. Holt and Adam M. 
Bossler, “Predictors of Patrol Officer Interest in Cybercrime Training and Investigation in Selected United 
States Police Departments,” Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking 15, no. 9 (December 
2012): 464–465, https://doi.org/10.1089/cyber.2011.0625.  
2 Todd G. Shipley and Art Bowker, “Introduction to Internet Crime,” in Investigating Internet Crimes: 
An Introduction to Solving Crimes in Cyberspace, ed. Nick Selby (Waltham, MA: Elsevier Science & 
Technology Books, 2013), 12–13, ProQuest. 
3 Shipley and Bowker, 13; Chuck Wexler, New National Commitment Required: The Changing Nature 
of Crime and Criminal Investigations (Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum, 2018), 8. 
xvi 
cybercrime is another challenge that they face. It is hard for decision makers to make an 
informed decision because studies that may otherwise provide valuable data on the 
different types of strategies or models used to address cybercrime investigative capabilities 
and capacity are lacking.  
This thesis set out to help close the gap in research related to the different 
cybercrime response strategies or models by answering the research question. Of three 
common models local law enforcement agencies employ to address cybercrime 
investigative capabilities and capacity—internal resources, conventional task forces, and 
hybrid task forces—is one or a combination thereof best suited to address the needs of 
small, midsize, or large agencies? To answer this question, the SWOT, which is an 
acronym for strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats, analysis framework was 
used for analysis of the three different models. SWOT analysis was chosen because of its 
longstanding history of usage for examining internal and external factors that influence 
organizational environments.4 The analysis focused on three key attributes of each of three 
models that had the most significant influence over cybercrime investigative capabilities 
and capacity: level of cybercrime-investigative training and expertise development for 
personnel, prioritization of cybercrime-related cases, and funding sources. 
The results of the SWOT analysis were: (1) a qualitative assessment of the three 
different models described in the study, (2) recommendations for local law enforcement 
decision makers to consider when developing policies and protocols to address cybercrime 
investigative capabilities and capacity, and (3) recommendations for future research.  
The findings of the SWOT analysis revealed commonalities and differences 
between the internal resources, conventional task forces, and hybrid task forces models. 
The commonalities were opportunities for cybercrime investigative training among first 
responders and other personnel not serving in cybercrime investigative roles for all three 
 
4 David W. Pickton and Sheila Wright, “What’s SWOT in Strategic Analysis?,” Strategic Change 7, 
no. 2 (1998): 102–3, https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-1697(199803/04)7:2%3C101::AID-
JSC332%3E3.0.CO;2-6; Marilyn M. Helms and Judy Nixon, “Exploring SWOT Analysis—Where Are We 
Now? A Review of Academic Research from the Last Decade,” Journal of Strategy and Management 3, 
no. 3 (2010): 215–18, https://doi.org/10.1108/17554251011064837. 
xvii 
models, threats related to funding for all three models, and strengths related to case 
prioritization for the internal resources and hybrid task forces models. The differences were 
weaknesses related to workload capacity with the internal resources model, weaknesses 
related to case prioritization with the conventional task forces model, and weaknesses 
related to decentralized makeup of the hybrid task forces model.  
The recommendations were grouped by their relevance to different size local law 
enforcement agencies. As defined in this study, small agencies were those with fewer than 
60 officers or serving populations of fewer than 60,000, midsize agencies were those with 
between 60 and 99 officers or serving populations between 60,000 to 99,000, and large 
agencies were those with over 99 officers or serving populations over 99,000. For small to 
midsize agencies, the recommendations were participation in the hybrid task forces models 
and consolidation and sharing of internal cybercrime resources. For large agencies, the 
recommendation was for combining internal resources with the conventional or hybrid task 
forces models. For small, midsize, and large agencies, the recommendation was training to 
increase cybercrime capabilities for all agency personnel.  
The thesis concluded by answering the research question that established the 
foundation for the study. In doing so, an argument was made for the hybrid task forces 
models as being the most adaptable to fit the needs of small, midsize, and large local law 
enforcement agencies alike with a caution that it is not a “one size fits all solution” based 
on the findings of the study. Future research recommendations are made for studying the 
effectiveness of each model that includes both qualitative and quantitative data, what an 
effective distribution of cybercrime investigative knowhow throughout local law 
enforcement agencies would entail, and the level of cybercrime investigative training that 
should be provided to new and experienced officers.  
xviii 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The over 18,000 U.S. local law enforcement agencies are expected to enforce laws 
and investigate crimes; cybercrime is no exception. As indicated in the first page of the 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security Cybersecurity Strategy, securing this nation’s 
cyberspace is a homeland security responsibility shared between local, state, and federal 
law enforcement agencies. It is not just about the prevention of crimes in cyberspace; it 
also includes disrupting cybercrime and holding cybercriminals accountable. Contrary to 
the popular belief that investigating cybercrimes is only the responsibility of federal law 
enforcement agencies, local enforcement agencies are on the frontlines of the fight against 
cybercrime.1 With the majority of local law enforcement agencies in the United States 
being small in size, and having limited cybercrime investigative capabilities, cybercrime-
related enforcement efforts can be a daunting task.2 Despite resources and other challenges, 
local law enforcement agencies, regardless of size, must have the capabilities and capacity 
for cybercrime investigative functions. 
Although no one agreed upon definition for cybercrime takes precedence in the law 
enforcement community, most definitions resemble one another and account for the 
different types of cybercrimes. For the purposes of this study, Shipley’s and Bowker’s 
definition of cybercrime is used: crimes made possible by the emergence of technology, 
whether they be traditional crimes transformed by technology or crimes facilitated via 
technology.3 The most common cybercrimes being reported are thefts that involve non-
payment for services or goods received and non-delivery of paid goods and services, 
 
1 Chuck Wexler, The Role of Local Law Enforcement Agencies in Preventing and Investigating 
Cybercrime (Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum, 2014), 2, https://www.policeforum.org/
assets/docs/Critical_Issues_Series_2/the%20role%20of%20local%20law%20enforcement%
20agencies%20in%20preventing%20and%20investigating%20cybercrime%202014.pdf; Thomas J. Holt 
and Adam M. Bossler, “Predictors of Patrol Officer Interest in Cybercrime Training and Investigation in 
Selected United States Police Departments,” Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking 15, no. 9 
(December 2012): 15, https://doi.org/10.1089/cyber.2011.0625. 
2 Todd G. Shipley and Art Bowker, “Introduction to Internet Crime,” in Investigating Internet Crimes: 
An Introduction to Solving Crimes in Cyberspace, ed. Nick Selby (Waltham, MA: Elsevier Science & 
Technology Books, 2013), 12–13, ProQuest. 
3 Shipley and Bowker, 2. 
2 
extortion, and breaches of personal data.4 Cybercrime encompasses a broad spectrum of 
crimes that affect people everywhere.  
Using open-source information from scholarly documents, government reports, and 
books, supplemented by answers from questionnaires distributed to a cross-section of local 
law enforcement agencies of varying sizes and multijurisdictional cybercrime task forces, 
this thesis lumped common strategies for addressing the complex challenges associated 
with cybercrime investigative capabilities and capacity into three models: internal 
resources, conventional task forces, and hybrid task forces. The models were examined 
using a recognized analysis framework. The findings of the analysis set the basis for 
recommendations regarding policy and protocol considerations for local law enforcement 
agencies seeking to increase their cybercrime investigative capabilities and capacity.  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
Cybercrime compromises the security of cyberspace, making it both a homeland 
security and societal issue. The U.S. economy suffers billions of dollars in loss annually as 
the result of cybercrime.5 Reports from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI’s) 
Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) and the Symantec Corporation provide statistical 
evidence that cybercrime is proliferating. Of the 246 million internet users in the United 
States, 143 million—or 58 percent—experienced cybercrime in 2017.6 Data collected 
between 2013 and 2017 revealed a steady increase in reported instances of internet crimes.7 
Moreover, an excess of 20 billion electronic communication devices will likely be 
 
4 Internet Crimes Complaint Center, 2018 Internet Crime Report (Washington, DC: Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, 2018), 19, https://pdf.ic3.gov/2018_IC3Report.pdf. 
5 Kristin Finklea and Catherine A. Theohary, Cybercrime: Conceptual Issues for Congress and U.S. 
Law Enforcement, CRS Report No. R42547 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2015), 8, 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=762027. 
6 Symantec Corporation, 2017 Norton Cyber Security Insights Report Global Results (Mountain View, 
CA: Symantec Corporation, 2017), 11, https://www.symantec.com/content/dam/symantec/docs/about/
2017-ncsir-global-results-en.pdf. 
7 Internet Crimes Complaint Center, 2017 Internet Crime Report (Washington, DC: Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, 2017), 4, https://pdf.ic3.gov/2017_IC3Report.pdf. 
3 
connected to the internet by 2020.8 Digital connectivity has permeated almost every aspect 
of our daily lives, which thus creates more opportunities for cybercriminals and increasing 
the demand for local law enforcement to intervene.  
The challenges cybercrime investigative tasks create for local law enforcement 
agencies differ from those associated with traditional or “real-world crimes,” and must be 
addressed differently. Employing traditional data-driven crime mitigation strategies is not 
effective with cybercrime because of underreporting and current flaws in data collection 
that yield an incomplete picture of the problem scope.9 In addition to the data challenges, 
the level of cybercrime training for local law enforcement is not mandated or 
standardized.10 Moreover, no set national standards or any type of unified plan is available 
for law enforcement’s response to cybercrime.11 Most American local law enforcement 
agencies lack the resources necessary for the level of investigative capabilities and capacity 
to perform cybercrime-related functions at a pace that keeps up with the demand.12 In a 
2014 Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) study, local law enforcement agencies 
from around the nation were queried about the three most significant challenges impeding 
their ability to perform cybercrime investigations effectively. Of the responding agencies, 
54 percent reported a lack of staffing, 31 percent reported a lack of funding, and 29 percent 
reported a lack of internal expertise.13 These realities combined with cybercrime’s rapidly 
evolving nature have most law enforcement agencies consistently “behind the curve” in 
the fight against it. Local law enforcement agencies continue to struggle with effective 
 
8 Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Homeland Security Cybersecurity Strategy 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2018), 2, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/DHS-Cybersecurity-Strategy_1.pdf. 
9 Finklea and Theohary, Cybercrime: Conceptual Issues, 18. 
10 Hollis Stambaugh et al., Electronic Crime Needs Assessment for State and Local Law Enforcement, 
NCJ 186276 (Washington, DC: Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, 2001); Brian A. Reaves, 
State and Local Law Enforcement Training Academies, 2013, NCJ 249784 (Washington, DC: Bureau of 
Justice Statistics, 2013), 5, https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/slleta13.pdf. 
11 Shipley and Bowker, “Introduction to Internet Crime,” 13. 
12 Mieke Eoyang et al., To Catch A Hacker: Toward a Comprehensive Strategy to Identify, Pursue, 
and Punish Malicious Cyber Actors (Washington, DC: Third Way, 2018), 14, https://thirdway.imgix.net/
pdfs/override/To_Catch_A_Hacker_Report.pdf. 
13 Wexler, The Role of Local Law Enforcement, 7. 
4 
strategies or models to address all the challenges associated with the investigations of this 
prevalent crime.14 The mitigation challenges associated with cybercrimes are likely to 
remain a constant threat that forces local law enforcement agencies to assess and adapt 
strategies continually for countering them.  
The ways in which local law enforcement agencies currently address cybercrime 
investigations depend on multiple variables. The most significant variables are related to 
agency size and the amount of available resources.15 Some agencies, mostly larger ones, 
have internal resources to justify dedicated cybercrime units or dedicated specialized 
personnel, while others have designated personnel capable of performing cybercrime 
investigative functions. In recent years, the number of midsize to large local law 
enforcement agencies with dedicated cybercrime units or specialized personnel dedicated 
to cyber-investigative function has increased.16 Smaller agencies, with limited resources, 
often need to rely on partnerships with other agencies or outside resources to help them 
with complex cybercrime investigative functions.17 To compensate for the challenges 
associated with cybercrime investigations, some local law enforcement agencies 
participate in collaborative cybercrime efforts, such as multijurisdictional task forces 
models. Task forces combine resources from multiple jurisdictions in an effort to increase 
the investigative capabilities and capacity of the participating agencies.18 Some of these 
task forces include formal and informal agreements from private-sector and academic 
 
14 Sean E. Goodison, Robert C. Davis, and Brian A. Jackson, Digital Evidence and the U.S. Criminal 
Justice System (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2015), 6, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/
RR890.html. 
15 Dale Willits and Jeffrey Nowacki, “The Use of Specialized Cybercrime Policing Units: An 
Organizational Analysis,” Criminal Justice Studies 29, no. 2 (June 2016): 24, https://doi.org/10.1080/
1478601X.2016.1170282. 
16 Brian A. Reaves, Local Police Departments, 2013: Personnel, Policies, and Practices, NCJ 248677 
(Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2015), 10, https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
lpd13ppp.pdf; Shelley S. Hyland and Elizabeth Davis, Local Police Departments, 2016: Personnel, NCJ 
252835 (Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2019), 10, www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
lpd16p.pdf. 
17 Willits and Nowacki, “The Use of Specialized Cybercrime Policing Units,” 12. 
18 David Povero, “Municipal Police Agencies Dial 911 When It Comes to Investigating Cyber-Related 
Crimes in the Future?,” Journal of California Law Enforcement 49, no. 3 (2015): 17, ProQuest. 
5 
subject matter expertise.19 These varied approaches demonstrate how different factors, 
such as available resources, drive the agency’s ability to address cybercrime investigative 
functions. 
A lack of consensus exists on a strategy or model that local law enforcement 
agencies of varying sizes can employ to offset the challenges associated with having 
cybercrime capabilities and capacity. As with the lack of accurate cybercrime statistics, 
data on the effectiveness of internal cybercrime resources and multijurisdictional efforts is 
also lacking.20 Despite many expert opinions about what strategies work the best, little 
comprehensive analysis or assessment of the common strategies used or touted as being 
effective have been documented. This gap leaves local law enforcement decision makers 
at a loss for making an informed decision regarding an effective strategy or model to 
address their organizations’ cybercrime investigative capabilities and capacity.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION  
Of three common models local law enforcement agencies employ to address 
cybercrime investigative capabilities and capacity—internal resources, conventional task 
forces, and hybrid task forces—is one or a combination thereof best suited to address the 
needs of small, midsize, or large agencies?  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW  
The purpose of this literature review is to identify, analyze, and assess available 
government documents, books, and scholarly sources related to the cybercrime 
investigative capabilities of local law enforcement agencies. The existing literature 
provides insight into the body of knowledge on the different approaches local law 
enforcement agencies use to address challenges with conducting cybercrime and cyber-
related investigations. The examination of these sources provides the foundation for 
 
19 Diana S. Dolliver, Carson Collins, and Beau Sams, “Hybrid Approaches to Digital Forensic 
Investigations: A Comparative Analysis in an Institutional Context,” Digital Investigation 23 (December 
2017): 124, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.diin.2017.10.005. 
20 Wexler, New National Commitment Required, 14; William Rhodes et al., Evaluation of the 
Multijurisdictional Task Forces (MJTFs), Phase II: MJTF Performance Monitoring Guide, NCJ 228942 
(Cambridge, MA: Abt Associates Inc., 2009), 1, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228942.pdf. 
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understanding and analysis of the three common models—internal resources, conventional 
task forces, and hybrid task forces—local law enforcement agencies employ to address the 
need for cybercrime investigative capabilities and capacity as defined and described in this 
study. The literature comes from multiple sources with differing perspectives on a variety 
of related topics for a more comprehensive study.  
1. Internal Resources Model 
The literature related to the topic of law enforcement agencies that use the internal 
resources model, as defined in this study, for cybercrime investigative capabilities and 
capacity was limited despite the prevalence of these types of resources in larger law 
enforcement agencies throughout urban areas around the nation. Most of the literature with 
a nexus to subject matter focused on challenges local law enforcement agencies faced when 
trying to implement or maintain cybercrime investigative capabilities and capacity. 
PERF produced two bodies of work that describe the challenges local law 
enforcement agencies face with cybercrime investigations and the ways in which agencies 
are increasing their cybercrime investigative capabilities and capacity. PERF assembled 
experts in criminal investigations, technology, and police operations and management to 
inform content in both of their studies.21 PERF called for local agencies to become 
involved in the fight against criminals harnessing technology and the internet by the 
creation of a workforce, supported by policies and protocols, capable of performing 
cybercrime investigative functions.22 Based on mostly anecdotal evidence from subject 
matter experts, PERF advocates for agencies to find employees within their organizations 
who possess the technical skills to serve in specialized cybercrime investigative roles.23 
Additionally, the experts argue for recruiting personnel who already have the technical 
competency and for civilianizing certain cybercrime investigative roles to increase the pool 
of qualified applicants.24 PERF’s subject matter experts contend that local law 
 
21 Wexler, New National Commitment Required, 1; Wexler, The Role of Local Law Enforcement, 1–2. 
22 Wexler, New National Commitment Required, 8. 
23 Wexler, The Role of Local Law Enforcement, 27–28. 
24 Wexler, New National Commitment Required, 55–56. 
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enforcement agencies can build their cybercrime investigative capabilities and capacity by 
spreading basic cybercrime investigative knowhow throughout the organization from 
patrol officers, who are the first link in the investigative process, to detectives.25 PERF 
cites multiple agencies for successfully incorporating cybercrime investigative capabilities 
and capacity throughout their agencies by reimaging traditional operational and 
organizational structures that incorporate digital investigation experts.26 The works from 
PERF rely mostly on anecdotal data from local law enforcement practitioners and decision 
makers. 
Scholarly and government-sponsored studies provide arguments for local law 
enforcement agencies having their own internal cybercrime investigative resources, as well 
as explanations for how jurisdictional and departmental factors influence their existence. 
A 2016 study by Willits and Nowacki titled “The Use of Specialized Cybercrime Policing 
Units: An Organizational Analysis,” contended that agency size, type, level of 
specialization, and available resources dictates whether or not a local law enforcement 
agency will have a dedicated cybercrime unit.27 Willits and Nowacki build upon their 
assertions from their 2016 study in a 2019 study titled “An Organizational Approach to 
Understanding Police Response to Cybercrime,” and contend that large agencies have more 
of a jurisdictional need to have their own specialized cybercrime units.28 According to a 
study by Bandl, the most significant factor linked to the level of specialization in a local 
law enforcement agency is the size of the agency.29 In their 2016 study, Willits and 
Nowacki asserted that as internal cybercrime units proliferated, smaller jurisdictions 
without a legitimate need for such a unit were more likely to form one based on decision 
 
25 Wexler, 60–61; Wexler, The Role of Local Law Enforcement, 32. 
26 Wexler, New National Commitment Required, 54. 
27 Willits and Nowacki, “The Use of Specialized Cybercrime Policing Units,” 30. 
28 Jeffrey Nowacki and Dale Willits, “An Organizational Approach to Understanding Police Response 
to Cybercrime,” Policing: An International Journal 43, no. 1 (November 2019): 71, https://doi.org/
10.1108/PIJPSM-07-2019-0117. 
29 Steven G. Bandl, “The Characteristics and Structure of Police Organizations,” in Police in America 
(Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc., 2018), 46. 
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makers feeling pressure from stakeholders.30 Harkin, Whelan, and Chang argue that 
cybercrime units have “proliferated” and are becoming the norm in today’s police 
organizations.31 The findings in the studies published by Willits and Nowacki, as well as 
Harkin, Whelan, and Chang are confirmed in a comparison of the data presented in Bureau 
of Justice Statistics (BJS) studies published in 2015 and 2019. These studies revealed that 
agencies employing 100 or more officers or serving populations of 100,000 or more had a 
19.3 percent increase between 2003 and 2016 in personnel designated for cybercrime 
investigative functions of which 21.2 percent accounted for personnel assigned to 
specialized cybercrime units.32 Despite multiple published studies explaining some of the 
drivers behind why more law enforcement agencies have designated internal resources for 
cybercrime investigative functions, original empirical research in this area is still relatively 
limited.33 The available literature provides evidence that local law enforcement agencies 
have become more invested in having their own cybercrime capabilities and capacity by 
designating more internal resources for cybercrime investigative functions. 
Although scholarly research and government studies provide explanations for why 
local law agencies are designating personnel or entire units for cybercrime investigative 
activities, research into the advantages and disadvantages of maintaining these types of 
internal resources or any comparative data with other available models that leverage 
outside resources is lacking. A comparison between data from BJS studies conducted in 
2013 and 2016 revealed a 7.1 percent decrease in staff designated for cybercrime 
investigative functions in local law enforcement agencies employing less than 100 officers 
or serving populations of less than 100,000 residents.34 The explanation for the decrease 
is not explained in the study and raises important questions as to the reasons for the 
 
30 Willits and Nowacki, “The Use of Specialized Cybercrime Policing Units,” 10. 
31 Diarmaid Harkin, Chad Whelan, and Lennon Chang, “The Challenges Facing Specialist Police 
Cyber-Crime Units: An Empirical Analysis,” Police Practice and Research 19, no. 6 (November 2018): 
519–20, https://doi.org/10.1080/15614263.2018.1507889. 
32 Reaves, Local Police Departments, 2013, 10; Hyland and Davis, Local Police Departments, 2016, 
10. 
33 Harkin, Whelan, and Chang, “The Challenges Facing Specialist Police Cyber-Crime Units,” 520. 
34 Reaves, Local Police Departments, 2013, 9; Hyland and Davis, Local Police Departments, 2016, 
10. 
9 
decrease. More recent studies conducted by Harkin, Whelan, and Chang and PERF 
provided empirical and anecdotal evidence of workload capacity challenges for personnel 
who perform cybercrime functions within local law enforcement agencies but lacked 
research on alternative approaches for reducing the workload.35 The existing literature 
related to local law enforcement agencies with internal resources for cybercrime 
investigative capabilities and capacity provided multiple arguments for having such 
resources but was not comprehensive enough to explain the pros and cons of the model 
related to other available models or strategies.  
2. Conventional Task Forces Model 
The literature related to the conventional task forces model, as defined in this study, 
was limited and underdeveloped compared to the literature available on the general topic 
of cybercrime. The conventional task forces model involves participating agencies 
providing personnel who, in turn, work under the task forces chain-of-command and from 
a centralized location. One of the main reasons for the formation of conventional task 
forces was to deal with the demands associated with cybercrime investigations that often 
exceed the capabilities and capacity of a single law enforcement agency.36 Both a 2001 
study conducted by the National Institute of Justice and a more recent study by PERF 
provide arguments for why participation in regionalized cybercrime task forces is an 
effective strategy for local law enforcement agencies to increase their cybercrime 
investigative capabilities and capacity.37 Subject matter experts contend cybercrime 
investigations are a “team sport” that do not occur in a vacuum, which thus makes them 
highly compatible with multijurisdictional collaborative efforts, such as the conventional 
 
35 Harkin, Whelan, and Chang, “The Challenges Facing Specialist Police Cyber-Crime Units,” 523–
24; Police Executive Research Forum, The Utah Model: A Path Forward for Investigating and Building 
Resilience to Cyber Crime (Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2017), 27, 
http://www.iacpcybercenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/The-Utah-Model-A-Path-Forward-for-
Investigating-and-Building-Resilience-to-Cybercrime.pdf. 
36 Willits and Nowacki, “The Use of Specialized Cybercrime Policing Units,” 10. 
37 Stambaugh et al., Electronic Crime Needs Assessment, 33; Police Executive Research Forum, The 
Role of Local Law Enforcement, 18. 
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task forces model.38 Scholarly studies and subject matter experts contend that cybercrime-
related investigations require multijurisdictional collaboration because of their cross-
jurisdictional nature and the volume of cases creating investigative capacity challenges for 
one agency.39 In a 2010 thesis by Michael P. Callagy, multiple arguments were made for 
consolidated policing efforts over efforts from individual police agencies.40 In a 2018 
report by PERF, subject matter experts asserted that cybercrime investigative capabilities 
and capacity challenges were addressed more efficiently when local and state law 
enforcement agencies combine specialized resources (personnel and equipment) in 
regionalized efforts.41 The complex multijurisdictional nature of cybercrimes lends itself 
to the conventional task forces model. 
Despite conventional crime task forces being in existence for decades, research on 
them is limited, which makes answers to questions regarding their effectiveness unclear. 
With no agreement on performance metrics for measuring the success of multijurisdictional 
task forces, data regarding their effectiveness is lacking.42 Since the early 1980s, 
conventional task forces have been used for combatting narcotics-related and other high-
profile crimes. The 2013 BJS Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics 
(LEMAS) data that revealed 49 percent of all local law enforcement agencies’ narcotics 
task forces provides evidence of their continued popularity.43 Two separate studies, one 
from 1998 and the other from 2000, resulted in a lack of conclusive evidence supporting 
 
38 Wexler, The Role of Local Law Enforcement, 18. 
39 Peter Bednar, Vasilios Katos, and Cheryl Hennell, “The Complexity of Collaborative Cyber Crime 
Investigations,” Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 6 (2009): 214, https://doi.org/
10.14296/deeslr.v6i0.1894. 
40 Michael P. Callagy, “Can Local Police and Sheriff’s Departments Provide a Higher Degree of 
Homeland Security Coordination and Collaboration through Consolidation of Police Services?” (master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010), 3–4, https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/5123/
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41 Wexler, New National Commitment Required, 63. 
42 Rhodes et al., Evaluation of the Multijurisdictional Task Forces, 1. 
43 Eric S. Jefferis et al., “An Examination of the Productivity and Perceived Effectiveness of Drug 
Task Forces,” Police Quarterly 1, no. 3 (September 1998): 86, https://doi.org/10.1177/
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the effectiveness of the conventional task forces model for combatting crimes.44 A more 
recent study conducted in 2009 attempted to correlate the effectiveness of conventional 
crime task forces using data related to the number of cases investigated, arrests, and 
prosecutions; however, the researchers cautioned that “an unquantifiable amount of 
measurement error” was associated with the data collected.45 Marcum et al. concluded that 
specialized child pornography cyber task forces (CTFs) were associated with an increased 
likelihood of detection resulting in more investigations and arrests.46 Although the limited 
available literature related to the conventional task forces model provided some compelling 
arguments for them, it lacked empirical data and a comparative analysis to other available 
models or strategies to support the arguments.  
3. Hybrid Task Forces Models  
The available literature related to the hybrid task forces model, as defined in this 
study, was the most limited compared to the other two models. Most of the literature was 
on related topics as opposed to the specific subject matter. The United States Secret 
Service’s Electronic Crimes Task Force (ECTF), one of the hybrid task forces models 
described in this study, joins multiple agencies from all levels of law enforcement together 
with private sector partners across the nation and internationally to share information and 
increase cybercrime investigative resources for the purpose of disrupting cybercriminals.47 
Bednar, Katos, and Hennell argue that the very nature of cybercrime investigations calls 
for multiagency collaboration to increase the investigative reach both across state lines and 
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internationally.48 A 2017 BJA and PERF joint case study highlighted a unique cybercrime 
task forces model that fit the hybrid model as described in this study because of its 
decentralized characteristics and flexibility. The study examined a task forces model 
created by the Utah Department of Public Safety (UDPS) coined by PERF as the “Utah 
model.”49 The model was chosen for the case study because its holistic approach to 
cybercrime investigations that involved collaboration with private-sector, academia, and 
critical infrastructure.50 Dolliver, Collins, and Sams conducted a 2017 study that consisted 
of a comparative analysis on eight “hybrid digital forensic task forces” throughout the 
United States that combined law enforcement agencies and academic institutions.51 
Although this study presented qualitative data highlighting the benefits of a collaborative 
hybrid cybercrime task forces model, it was a single narrowly study focused on hybrid 
models that had partnerships with academic institutions.52 The currently available research 
regarding multijurisdictional collaborative policing efforts supports the concepts like the 
hybrid task forces model described in this study as a strategy for overcoming some of the 
complex challenges associated with cybercrime investigations. 
Despite multiple scholarly documents validating collaborative efforts as effective 
strategies for addressing cybercrime investigations, research on the different types of 
collaborative efforts remains incomplete. Specifically, no known research is available into 
the benefits or drawbacks of the hybrid task forces model as defined for this study. The 
available body of related work in this area lacks comparisons between the different 
collaborative efforts or the use of internal resources. It also lacks comprehensive data or 
empirical evidence on the advantages and disadvantages of participation in these types of 
unique task forces models. Even though the report on the Utah model boasts the smart 
practices embedded in it, it lacks direct reference on how the model affects the cybercrime 
investigative capabilities or capacity for the participating agencies. Even though the focus 
 
48 Bednar, Katos, and Hennell, “The Complexity of Collaborative Cyber Crime Investigations,” 217. 
49 Police Executive Research Forum, The Utah Model, 1–2. 
50 Bureau of Justice Assistance, The Utah Model, 5–9. 
51 Dolliver, Collins, and Sams, “Hybrid Approaches to Digital Forensic Investigations,” 126–28. 
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on the Utah model provided compelling arguments for its effectiveness, it was a single case 
study and lacked comparative analysis to other existing strategies or models for addressing 
cybercrime investigative needs. The available research related to the hybrid models 
described in this study is underdeveloped.  
4. LEMAS: Its Strengths and Drawbacks 
Most statistical data used in this study came from the BJS LEMAS surveys that 
have considerable strengths and weaknesses. Due to relying on LEMAS statistics for the 
quantitative data in this study, it was included in the literature review. LEMAS provides 
robust data on local law enforcement agencies and have high response and survey 
completion rates.53 LEMAS surveys have been conducted periodically since 1987 and 
represent data aggregated from over 3,000 local and state law enforcement agencies. The 
BJS requests data from all local law enforcement agencies with 100 or more officers and 
with a random sampling of smaller agencies.54 The surveys categorize local law 
enforcement agencies by: 
• agencies with 100 or more officers or those that serve populations of 
100,000 or more 
• agencies with 99 or fewer officers or those that serve populations of less 
than 100,000.55 
The surveys used for this study represent data collected in 2013 and 2016. The 2013 survey 
had an 88 percent response rate, and the standard error percentages for the data used in this 
study were low, less than 1.5.56 The 2016 survey had an 81.7 percent response rate, and 
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55 Reaves, Local Police Departments, 2013, 9; Hyland and Davis, Local Police Departments, 2016, 
10. 
56 Reaves, 11–21. 
14 
standard error percentages for the data used in this study were less than 2.30.57 Due to 
issues related with the accuracy of respondent answers to the survey questions and some 
gaps in data collection, some of the reliability of LEMAS can be challenged.58 Despite the 
questions regarding reliability, the LEMAS reports have been and continue to be trusted 
sources for law enforcement data.  
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research for this study was used to examine three models being employed by 
local law enforcement agencies to address the need for cybercrime investigative 
capabilities and capacity: having internal resources, participation in conventional 
multijurisdictional task forces, and participation in hybrid multijurisdictional task forces. 
Most local law enforcement agencies that have cybercrime investigative capabilities and 
capacity employ one of or a combination of the models described in this study. 
In addition to information obtained from the literature, a survey in the form of a 
questionnaire was sent to a sample of local law enforcement agencies and both 
conventional and hybrid cybercrime task forces was distributed to a small sample group. 
(see the Appendix for the questionnaires used in the survey.) Of the 32 questionnaires 
distributed, 14 of the surveyed agencies responded for a response rate of 43.7 percent.  
Local law enforcement agencies and regional task forces from the State of 
California, which fit the conventional task forces model as defined for this study, made up 
most of the sample. This representation is significant to the study, as California accounts 
for the highest number of cybercrime victims in the nation.59 Some of the agencies that 
responded requested that their agency not be named in this study. These agencies are 
referenced by size as described previously and general location or region. See Tables 1 and 
2 for the agencies and task forces used in the survey. Although the response rate was too 
low to validate the sample, inconclusive, and not comprehensive enough, to determine a 
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common operating picture, the responses to the questionnaires were useful for shrinking 
gaps in the available open-source information.  
For the purposes of this study, the term local law enforcement agency was used for 
police departments, sheriff’s offices and departments, and investigative branches of district 
attorney’s offices. Agencies with fewer than 60 officers or serving populations of fewer 
than 60,000 were referred to as “small,” agencies with between 60 and 99 officers or 
serving populations between 60,000 and 99,000 were referred to as “midsize,” and those 
agencies with more than 99 officers or serving populations of more than 99,000 were 
referred to as “large.”  
Table 1. Respondent Agencies of the Survey 
AGENCY SIZE 
Belmont, CA. Police Department Small 
East Palo Alto, CA. Police Department  Small 
Hillsborough, CA. Police Department  Small 
Monterey County, CA. District Attorney’s 
Office Investigations Bureau  
Small 
*Police Department in Southern California  Midsize 
Mountain View, CA. Police Department Midsize 
*Police Department in Northern California  Midsize 
Redwood City, CA. Police Department Midsize 
Indianapolis Metropolitan Police 
Department 
Large 
Police Department in Oklahoma  Large 
Santa Clara County Sheriff’s Office Large 
*Agencies requested they not be named in the study. 
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Table 2. Respondent Task Forces of the Survey 
TASK FORCE  TYPE LOCATION 
Computer and Technology 
Crime High Tech 
Response Team (CATCH) 
Conventional-Regional  Southern California  
Electronic Crimes Task 
Force (ECTF)  
Hybrid-Federal  San Francisco Field Office 
Area 
Northern California 
Computer Crimes Task 
Force (NC3TF) 
Conventional-Regional  Northern California  
 
This study uses the SWOT analysis framework to examine three models for 
addressing cybercrime investigative capabilities and capacity described in this study. 
SWOT is an acronym for strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats. It is applicable 
to this study because it provides a simple collection method that considers both internal 
and external factors that influence an organizational environment.60 The SWOT analysis 
model has been in use for over 50 years.61 SWOT provides a longstanding and recognized 
framework to extract comparative data about the three models for addressing cybercrime 
investigative capabilities and capacity described in this study.  
The scope of this study focuses on three models used by local law enforcement 
agencies for increasing cybercrime investigative capabilities and capacity:  
• internal resources  
• conventional task forces  
• hybrid task forces  
 
60 David W. Pickton and Sheila Wright, “What’s SWOT in Strategic Analysis?,” Strategic Change 7, 
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As used in this study, capabilities are the range of cybercrime investigative functions an 
agency can perform based on available resources, and capacity is the amount of available 
resources.62 In the context of cybercrime investigative functions, resources include 
personnel with the necessary specialized training, specialized tools (equipment and 
software), and funding. The analysis focused on three key attributes of each of the three 
models that had the most significant influence over cybercrime investigative capabilities 
and capacity: 
• level of cybercrime-investigative training and expertise development for 
personnel 
• prioritization of cybercrime-related cases 
• funding sources 
The research for this study largely built on qualitative data from previous studies. 
Due to their nontraditional nature, traditional metrics for measuring the effectiveness of 
cybercrime investigative strategies are not always accurate and do not take into account 
variables unique to these complex investigative tasks.63 Challenges with obtaining digital 
evidence and jurisdictional reach often equate to a disproportionate amount of criminal 
cases opened in relation to the amount case referrals.64 Furthermore, statistics related to 
cybercrime arrests and case clearances are limited or not readily available via open-source 
documents and national crime reporting repositories, such as the FBI’s Uniformed Crime 
Reporting (UCR) Program and the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS).65 
Traditional metrics are not an accurate way of gauging the effectiveness of cybercrime 
investigative efforts.  
 
62 Joseph W. Pfeifer and Ophelia Roman, “Tiered Response Pyramid: A System-Wide Approach to 
Build Response Capability and Surge Capacity,” Homeland Security Affairs 12, art. 5 (December 2016): 4, 
https://www.hsaj.org/articles/13324. 
63 Police Executive Research Forum, The Utah Model, 34. 
64 Police Executive Research Forum, 34–35. 
65 Wexler, New National Commitment Required, 13. 
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The success of cybercrime investigative efforts requires the use of metrics not 
solely based on arrests and criminal prosecutions. Examples include the use of victim-
centered metrics not based solely on arrests and prosecutions, such as the disruption of 
major criminal networks, loss recovery for victims, specialized training offered, and 
prevention of additional victimization as a result of cybercrime intelligence gathered and 
shared.66 Australia’s National Plan to Combat Cybercrime measures the capabilities and 
capacity of government agencies to address cybercrimes in terms of predicting, preventing, 
and disrupting them.67 For these reasons, this study focused on the attributes of the three 
different models that correlated with their cybercrime investigative capabilities and 
capacity.  
The results of the SWOT analysis were: (1) a qualitative assessment of the three 
different models described in the study, (2) recommendations for local law enforcement 
decision makers to consider when developing policies and protocols to address cybercrime 
investigative capabilities and capacity, and (3) recommendations for future research.  
E. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Chapter II provides a summary of the three models—internal resources, 
conventional task forces, and hybrid task forces—examined in this study. The different 
models are defined within the scope of the study and examples are provided for context. 
The chapter discusses how local law enforcement agencies employ the different models 
and provides some relevant data and background information.  
Chapter III examines each of the models using the SWOT analysis framework to 
assess attributes related to cybercrime investigative capabilities and capacity. These 
attributes are the amount of training provided to assigned personnel that develops their 
technical expertise, how case referrals are prioritized, and funding sources. A combination 
of open-source information, the literature reviewed, and information obtained from the 
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questionnaires (listed in the Appendix of this study) provide context for significant 
strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats associated with each of the models.  
Chapter IV concludes the study by describing the main findings of the SWOT 
analysis of the three models and making recommendations for local law enforcement 
decision makers to consider when forming policies and protocols related to how their 
agencies will address the need cybercrime investigative capabilities and capacity. The 
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II. THE DIFFERENT MODELS: INTERNAL RESOURCES, 
CONVENTIONAL TASK FORCES, AND HYBRID TASK FORCES  
This chapter explains the three models—internal resources, conventional task 
forces, and hybrid task forces—as they have been defined and categorized for this study. 
In addition to providing background information about the models, the chapter concludes 
that these models or a combination thereof have been adopted by many local law 
enforcement agencies as a means of having cybercrime investigative capabilities and 
capacity.  
A. INTERNAL RESOURCES 
“Internal resources” as used in this study refers to local law enforcement agencies 
that have dedicated cybercrime units or other designated personnel who perform a range 
of cybercrime investigative functions ranging from digital forensics to cyber-related 
investigations. In this model, funding for specialized training and tools comes primarily 
from internal sources but can be supplemented by external sources, such as grants. The 
prioritization of cases is solely dictated by organizational or jurisdictional factors. 
Dedicated cybercrime units have been adopted by multiple local law enforcement 
agencies as a strategy for internal cybercrime investigative capabilities and capacity. A 
2016 study revealed that the formation or use of cybercrime units had tripled between 2000 
and 2013.68 Environmental factors (i.e., population served and regional orientation) and 
organizational factors (i.e., size and amount of specialization) influence whether a local 
law enforcement agency has a dedicated cybercrime unit.69 For example, large 
departments are more likely to have dedicated cybercrime units than small ones.70 The 
2013 BJS LEMAS survey—that designated “small” agencies as those with 99 or fewer 
officers and “large” agencies as those with 100 or more officers—revealed that 39 percent 
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of large local law enforcement agencies had personnel assigned to dedicated cybercrime 
units, which was a 20 percent increase from 2003. The same study also revealed only six 
percent of small to midsize agencies had personnel assigned to dedicated cybercrime 
units.71 All three of the large agencies that responded to our survey had their own internal 
cybercrime investigative resources. Of all the factors, size has a direct correlation as to 
whether a local law enforcement agency will have a dedicated cybercrime unit. 
The size and makeup of cybercrime units depend on organizational factors related 
to the local law enforcement agency. Some agencies have a single person assigned to their 
equivalent of a dedicated cybercrime “unit” while others have multiple people.72 For 
example, the survey revealed that the Monterey County, California, District Attorney’s 
Office Investigations Bureau (MCDABI), which has 32 employees, has one employee 
assigned to its digital forensic lab, supported by three sworn investigators who assist the 
lab in conjunction with regular investigative duties. The Montgomery County, Maryland, 
Police Department, which has approximately 1,900 employees, has five fulltime digital 
forensics examiners assigned to its dedicated Electronic Crimes Unit. Five detectives, who 
are assigned to different units throughout the department, serve as part-time digital 
forensics examiners and supplement fulltime examiners.73 Some agencies use civilian staff 
with specialized computer skills to perform technical functions, such as digital forensics, 
in support of sworn investigators.74 Local law enforcement agencies use a variety of 
staffing models in their cybercrime units. 
Local law enforcement agencies without dedicated cybercrime units often have 
other personnel capable of performing cybercrime investigatory functions. The 2013 
LEMAS survey revealed that 36 percent of large and 20 percent of small- to midsize- sized 
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local law enforcement agencies, without dedicated cybercrime units, had other designated 
personnel to perform cybercrime investigatory functions.75 In 2003, roughly 32 percent of 
large agencies had designated personnel for this function. The 2013 LEMAS findings also 
revealed that small to midsize agencies were more likely to have designated personnel for 
performing cybercrime investigative functions over a dedicated unit, whereas large 
agencies were more likely to have a dedicated cybercrime unit.76 Even agencies without 
dedicated cybercrime units have taken steps to increase their cybercrime investigative 
capabilities and capacity.  
Local law enforcement agencies deploy their cybercrime investigative resources in 
different ways depending on organizational needs. The Patterson Police Department, a 
large local police agency in New Jersey, uses a decentralized approach to cybercrime 
investigative capabilities and capacity by pairing tech-savvy detectives with more 
experienced detectives who have expertise in traditional investigations.77 By the same 
token, from the survey, the Hillsborough Police Department, a small local police 
department in California, uses its general crimes detectives to perform cybercrime 
investigative functions. Other sworn specialists, who have extra training in digital 
forensics, augment the detectives and assist with more complex cyber investigations. The 
available research supports that having internal cybercrime resources has been an accepted 
practice by many small and midsize to large local law enforcement agencies for improving 
cybercrime investigative capabilities and capacity.  
Whether they have dedicated units or other designated personnel, many local law 
enforcement agencies have accepted the need to have internal resources to address 
cybercrime investigative functions. A 2013 LEMAS report showed a 17 percent increase 
in the number of dedicated cybercrime units for large law enforcement agencies between 
2003 and 2013, as shown in Figure 1.78 Thus, in 2003, 59 percent, and in 2013, 76 percent 
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of large agencies, had either dedicated units or other designated personnel for cybercrime 
investigative duties.79 Enough local law enforcement agencies have adopted internal 
cybercrime investigative resources to legitimize the practice among the local law 
enforcement community.  
 
Figure 1. Comparison of Large Agencies between 2003 and 2013 with 
Personnel Designated for Cybercrime Investigative Duties. 
B. CONVENTIONAL TASK FORCES  
The conventional task forces model as used in this study refers to formal 
collaborative arrangements or agreements between two or more participating agencies for 
performing a range of cybercrime investigative functions ranging from digital forensics to 
cyber-related investigations. In this model, assigned personnel from different agencies are 
combined as one entity under the task forces and the majority of them work together from 
a centralized location. The home agency relinquishes the day-to-day control over their 
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assigned personnel to the task forces chain of command. Participating agencies receive full 
or partial salary reimbursement for personnel assigned to the task forces.  
Local law enforcement agencies commonly use participation in conventional task 
forces as means to addressing complex crimes. This model has become increasing more 
popular over the years as a strategy for combatting a variety of crimes.80 Tens of thousands 
of police officers from local law enforcement agencies around the nation participate in this 
type of task forces model.81 Conventional task forces involve formal operational 
partnerships between multiple local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies for 
increased jurisdictional reach.82 Participating agencies consolidate their resources in the 
task forces to perform regional cybercrime investigative functions.83 Combining resources 
helps agencies increase their cybercrime investigative capabilities and capacity while 
minimizing the drain on any one agency’s resources.  
Narcotics task forces have been in existence for many years and law enforcement 
agencies of all sizes continue to participate in them. The formation of narcotics task forces 
became popular in the 1980s as an enforcement strategy to deal with the cross-jurisdictional 
and complex nature of narcotics trafficking crimes, which required coordination and 
collaboration between multiple law enforcement agencies from all levels.84 Narcotics task 
forces have continued to grow in popularity since their inception.85 The 2013 LEMAS data 
revealed that 49 percent of all agencies surveyed participated in narcotics task forces. 
Moreover, 100 percent of agencies serving populations of 1,000,000 or more participated 
in them, and 31 percent of agencies serving populations of 2,499 or fewer participated. 
This survey also revealed that 13 percent of local law enforcement agencies participated in 
gang task forces and four percent in human trafficking task forces, with large agencies 
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having higher percentages of participation in all.86 The available research validated 
participation in conventional task forces as a widely used strategy by local law enforcement 
agencies for dealing with the challenges associated with complex crimes that span across 
jurisdictions.  
Following the popularity of other task forces, conventional task forces for 
addressing cybercrime have become more popular over the years. With five regional 
cybercrime task forces located throughout the state, California cybercrime task forces 
provided a significant amount of data for this study.87 All the regional cybercrime task 
forces in California have a designated lead agency that manages the administration of the 
task forces and has fiduciary responsibility.88 The five regional cybercrime task forces are 
NC3TF, the Sacramento Valley Hi-Tech Crimes Task Force (SVHTCTF), the Rapid 
Enforcement Allied Computer Team (REACT), the Southern California High Tech Task 
Force (SCHTTF), and the Computer and CATCH.89 Survey respondents from NC3TF and 
CATCH who shared that staffing for the task forces is comprised from agencies in the 
region. The size of the task forces and number of affiliate agencies depends on the region 
and the task forces composition includes local, state, and federal law enforcement 
officers.90 Most cybercrime task forces fit into the conventional model described in this 
section.  
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C. HYBRID TASK FORCES  
Hybrid task forces as used in this study refer to formal collaborative arrangements 
or agreements between more than one participating agency that perform a range of 
cybercrime investigative functions from digital forensics to cyber-related investigations. 
This model mostly decentralized in makeup as assigned personnel have the flexibility to 
work from their home agencies or separate locations. Participation in this task forces model 
has benefits related to specialized training and equipment and may include limited funding 
assistance in the form of asset forfeiture sharing and reimbursement of some personnel 
costs. The home agency maintains the majority of day-to-day control over its personnel 
assigned to the task forces.  
The United States Secret Service’s ECTF fits the description of hybrid task forces 
as used in this study. The ECTF is a network of more than 2,500 investigators from 
international, federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies connected to each other 
through this hybrid task force model, as well as to academic and private-sector partners.91 
ECTFs number 39 throughout the United States, as well as one in London, and one in Rome 
that allow them to focus on regional issues.92 Per our survey’s responses, the ECTF allows 
participating agencies to choose who is assigned to the task force while they work from 
their home agencies in either a full- or part-time capacity. The decentralized makeup of the 
ECTFs allows for a large network of member agencies that collectively support one another 
with cybercrime investigative tasks on an ad hoc basis.93 Our survey responses confirmed 
that small, midsize, and large agencies participate in the ECTF. The ECTF provides 
agencies with a way to supplement their internal resources, as well as an alternative to 
participation in a conventional task forces model. 
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For this study, UDPS’s Utah Cyber Crimes Task Force (UCCTF) fits the hybrid 
task forces model because of its nontraditional and mostly decentralized makeup. The 
UCCTF combines a cybercrimes unit from UDPS with resources from federal law 
enforcement and other government agencies that work together from separate locations.94 
The UCCTF, also referred to as the “Utah model,” benefits from robust partnerships that 
improve the capabilities and capacity of the model.95 The Utah model is a partnership 
between the Cyber Crime Unit of the UDPS’ State Bureau of Investigation (SBI), the Utah 
Statewide Information and Analysis Center (SIAC), the Utah State Department of 
Technology Services (DTS), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the FBI. 
The UCCTF has two civilian employees, a cyber intelligence analyst, who is located at the 
SIAC, and a digital forensics analyst, who is located in the region’s Regional Computer 
Forensics Laboratories (RCFL). Civilian private-sector partners serve as subject matter 
experts for relevant information sharing, and for threat advisories (See Table 1).96 As well 
as combining centralized and decentralized aspects of a collaborative effort, the UCCTF is 
both multidisciplinary and multijurisdictional.  
Operations Wellspring (OWS) is a unique component of the Utah model that 
integrates SBI with the FBI. Through OWS, the SBI Cyber Crimes Unit, which consists of 
one full-time sergeant and two full-time detectives, partners with the FBI and is physically 
located in the FBI’s Salt Lake City field office. OWS, which was piloted in Utah, has 
expanded to other states and is open to both state and local agencies.97 The OWS 
partnership differs from traditional federal collaborative efforts, as no federal funding is 
associated with it.98 SBI Cyber Crimes Unit’s participation in OWS was another 
nontraditional aspect of the UCCTF hybrid model. See Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Agency Involvement in the Utah Cyber Crimes Task Force.99 
The UCCTF is the only task force in this study that has staff assigned to a regional 
fusion center. Many of the nation’s fusion centers have cyber-focused analysts and other 
staff who provide information on cybercrime and cybersecurity trends to law enforcement 
agencies and other fusion center partners.100 The integration of multiple levels of law 
enforcement and private sector partners makes fusion centers ideal for the sharing of 
important cybercrime and cybersecurity related information.101 The UCCTF’s cyber 
analyst assists investigators by sharing cyber-related criminal intelligence and vetting 
incoming cases to determine the criminal nexus and if enough evidence is available to open 
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an investigation.102 Having a task forces member assigned to the SAIC makes sense for 
both cyber threat and criminal intelligence sharing. 
D. CONCLUSION  
Internal resources, conventional task forces, and hybrid task forces as described in 
this chapter are all accepted models for addressing the challenges related to cybercrime 
investigative functions. Multiple local law enforcement agencies have adopted one or a 
combination of the three different models describe in this study for addressing cybercrime 
investigative capabilities and capacity. In Chapter III, the three different models are 
examined in terms of investigative capabilities and capacity using the SWOT analysis 
framework. 
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III. ANALYSIS OF THE THREE MODELS: INTERNAL 
RESOURCES, CONVENTIONAL TASK FORCES, AND HYBRID 
TASK FORCES  
In this study, SWOT analysis was used to make general comparisons between the 
three models to derive conclusions about how they impact the cybercrime investigative 
capabilities and capacity of local law enforcement agencies. The level of cybercrime training 
and expertise development for assigned personnel, prioritization of cybercrime investigations, 
and funding sources are compared relative to each model based solely on the findings from 
the research conducted for this study. The analysis was based only on the open-source 
information obtained during the research for this study and was not intended to be an 
exhaustive all-inclusive list of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats associated 
with each model. Only significant characteristics for each category in the framework are 
described. The analysis is intended to add to the limited body of research in this space.  
A. INTERNAL RESOURCES 
This section uses open-source information from the literature reviewed, government 
documents, and responses from the questionnaires in Section D of Chapter I to analyze how 
the internal resources model impacts cybercrime investigative capabilities and capacity using 
the SWOT framework. 
1. Strengths 
When compared to the task forces models in this study, a strength of the internal 
resources model is an agency having full autonomy to prioritize cases. Agencies have the 
ability prioritize cybercrime investigative efforts based on specific jurisdictional needs related 
to community impact and workload capacity.103 Agencies with their own internal cybercrime 
resources have more flexibility with how they prioritize cases and are not otherwise tethered 
to multijurisdictional task forces protocols for or outside agency influence over case 
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prioritization.104 The flexibility to prioritize cybercrime investigations specific to 
departmental needs ensure local law enforcement agencies are accountable to the 
communities they serve.105 As revealed in our survey responses, agencies with their own 
internal cybercrime investigative resources are able to prioritize cases based on the specific 
type and jurisdictional needs at the time.  
A successful investigation involving the Metropolitan Nashville, TN Police 
Department (MNPD) provides an example of how the ability to prioritize investigations based 
on jurisdictional needs leads to successful and timely cyber-related investigative actions. In 
2013, the MNPD investigated a high-profile sexual assault investigation involving a 21-year-
old female student from Vanderbilt University, who was drugged and raped by four members 
of the football team. The success of the investigation hinged on the timely collection and 
analysis of digital evidence consisting of videos and photos taken during the sexual assault 
that were shared via text messages between one of the suspects and an individual in Riverside, 
California. Since the MNPD had internal cybercrime resources, the necessary investigative 
steps were prioritized that allowed critical digital evidence to be collected and analyzed in a 
timely manner. This evidence, ultimately, led to the identification of multiple suspects, their 
arrests, and subsequent criminal prosecution.106 This case was successful because of the 
MNPD’s ability to prioritize the necessary cybercrime investigative task forces in a manner 
that met their needs.  
2. Weaknesses  
As compared to the task forces models, internal cybercrime investigative resources 
often have capacity challenges in keeping up with the workload. Many local law enforcement 
agencies are faced with significant capacity challenges associated with a shortage of personnel 
and technical tools to meet the demand for cybercrime-related investigative support and turn 
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to task forces models to help overcome the challenges.107 Limited cybercrime investigative 
expertise in most local law enforcement agencies, coupled with the cyber-elements that are 
part of almost every traditional crime investigation today, has caused a significant increase in 
the workload of cybercrime investigative specialists.108 Due to a lack of understanding 
regarding workload and capacity challenges associated with cybercrime investigative 
functions, executive leadership in many departments have failed to make having such 
capabilities a priority.109 Unlike multijurisdictional models that control workload based on 
case prioritization protocols to prevent wasting time-consuming investigative efforts, agencies 
with internal resources are more beholden to jurisdictional-specific expectations for and 
political influence over which cases to investigate or prioritize.110 Agencies with internal 
cybercrime investigative resources face similar challenges related to the workload capacity of 
their available resources.  
Evidence of workload capacity challenges associated with the internal resources 
model can be found in data from scholarly studies and agency-specific reports. In a 2018 study 
involving two large Australian police agencies, personnel serving in cybercrime investigative 
roles reported an annual increase from 3,500 to 4,000 in cases referred and noted how the 
cases were more complex, which thus increased the amount of time needed to process 
them.111 Between 2017 and 2019, the Computer and Digital Forensic Unit (CDFU) of the 
Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (IMPD) experienced a 42.8 percent increase in 
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forensic examinations.112 The data illustrates the rising workload capacity challenges faced 
by agencies with internal cybercrime investigative resources.  
3. Opportunities  
Opportunities exist to improve the capabilities and capacity of the internal resources 
model by increasing basic cybercrime investigative knowledge throughout the agency. 
Cybercrime specialists can avoid hours of wasted time triaging digital devices and attempting 
to recover evidence when first responders and detectives, who are trained in basic cybercrime 
investigative techniques, assess and preserve digital devices with evidentiary value.113 
Considering most cyber-related investigations begin with patrol officers, their ability to 
conduct preliminary investigative steps is critical to the success of any further investigative 
actions by specialists.114 Training patrol officers in basic cybercrime investigative functions 
represents a significant opportunity to enhance an agency’s cybercrime investigative 
capabilities and capacity as patrol functions represent about 70 percent of operations for most 
local law enforcement agencies.115 Despite the data, a 2013 BJS study of 664 state and local 
law enforcement agencies revealed that trainees were only receiving three hours of 
cybercrime-related training in the basic academy.116 The research supports arguments for 
agencies with internal resources to provide more cybercrime investigative training and 
expertise development opportunities for first responders and other personnel who do not serve 
in cybercrime investigative roles.  
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Some agencies have already prioritized the need to spread cybercrime investigative 
expertise throughout their organizations by providing cyber-related training to staff who do 
not serve in specialized cybercrime investigative roles. The Patterson, NJ Police Department 
has personnel with cybercrime investigative capabilities and capacity in all of its detective 
units to ensure these resources are more readily available.117 Per our survey, the Santa Clara 
County, CA Sheriff’s Office (SCCSO) reports having more personnel available to assist their 
cybercrime specialists by providing their patrol deputies with 40 hours and detectives with up 
to 100 hours of both formal and informal training in cybercrime investigative techniques. 
Montgomery County, MD Police Department trains officers in the academy how to identify 
and triage devices that may have digital evidentiary value, which has resulted in the weeding 
out of digital devices that do not require analysis by specialists.118 First responders and 
detectives with cybercrime investigative skills increase the internal cybercrime investigative 
capabilities and capacity of an agency. 
4. Threats  
Agency and other funding necessary for cybercrime investigative resources is an 
ongoing threat to the internal resource model. An agency’s commitment to maintaining in-
house cybercrime investigative capabilities and capacity is determined by the amount of 
funding set aside for essential ongoing expenses.119 Ongoing funding challenges have been 
a significant argument for individual local law enforcement agencies to consolidate and unify 
efforts.120 In a 2014 PERF report, 31 percent of agencies surveyed cited a lack of funding for 
internal cybercrime investigative resources.121 The findings of the PERF study were 
supported by another 2014 study that revealed how local law enforcement agencies faced 
funding challenges that compromised their ability to maintain essential digital evidence tools 
 
117 Wexler, New National Commitment Required, 55. 
118 Wexler, 60–61. 
119 Greg Gogolin and James Jones, “Law Enforcement’s Ability to Deal with Digital Crime and the 
Implications for Business,” Information Security Journal: A Global Perspective 19, no. 3 (2010): 110, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/19393555.2010.483931. 
120 Callagy, “Can Local Police and Sheriff’s Departments Provide a Higher Degree of Homeland 
Security Coordination and Collaboration Through Consolidation of Police Services?,” 3–4. 
121 Wexler, The Role of Local Law Enforcement, 7. 
36 
and software packages for performing cybercrime investigative functions.122 As revealed 
from responses to our survey from the MCDABI, even agencies that have their own internal 
resources rely on outside funding to offset the cost of equipment. Agencies that rely on internal 
resources continue to be susceptible to budgetary challenges that impact their cybercrime 
investigative capability and capacity.  
B. CONVENTIONAL TASK FORCES  
This section uses open-source information from the literature reviewed, government 
documents, and responses from the questionnaires in Section D of Chapter I to analyze how 
the conventional task forces model impacts cybercrime investigative capabilities and capacity 
of participating agencies using the SWOT framework. 
1. Strengths  
When compared to the internal resources model and hybrid task forces model, a 
strength of participation in conventional cybercrime task forces is the amount of ongoing 
specialized training for assigned personnel. Research has identified a correlation between 
increased investigative productivity and the amount of training provided to task forces 
members.123 Consolidation of resources has been credited with better and more uniformed 
training in addition to more exposure to a variety of different investigations.124 Moreover, the 
centralized makeup of the conventional model increases opportunities for hands-on training 
between collocated personnel with differing levels of expertise.125 Responses to our survey 
revealed that members of CATCH and NC3TF receive years of specialized training to qualify 
them in various cybercrime investigative disciplines and from their exposure to develop a high 
degree of specialized investigative expertise. Responses to the survey by NC3TF revealed that 
the task forces budgets approximately $62,000.00 annually for ongoing specialized training 
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to ensure members are highly skilled. An advantage of participating in a conventional task 
force is the amount of ongoing specialized training this task force provides.  
Successful investigations involving complex cyber-related crimes illustrate the high 
level of training received and expertise developed by investigators assigned to conventional 
task forces. A 2019 investigation into a multijurisdictional crime ring involving the theft of 
data from smartphones by an elaborate SIM (subscriber identity module) card swapping 
scheme, highlights the level of training received by task forces investigators from REACT, a 
northern California task force.126 The investigation led to the identification of multiple 
victims across the nation representing millions of dollars in loss and to the successful 
prosecution of the main suspect.127 In 2010, highly skilled investigators from the SCHTTF 
conducted an identity theft investigation that led to the arrest of a suspect who was part of a 
West African criminal organization involved in a sophisticated data intrusion crime 
scheme.128 These case examples showcase the cybercrime investigative capabilities of well-
trained conventional task forces investigators.  
2. Weaknesses  
When compared to internal resources and hybrid task forces models, a weakness of 
the conventional task forces model is the case prioritization for participating agencies. 
Conventional task forces combine personnel from multiple agencies into an independent 
entity not controlled or governed by the individual jurisdictional and investigative needs of 
the participating agencies.129 Most conventional task forces are accountable to grant funding 
performance data requirements that influence their investigative priorities.130 Although the 
two conventional task forces that responded to our survey prioritize cases originating from the 
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home agencies of their assigned personnel, previous research contends that response delays 
for investigative requests from agencies with personnel assigned to task forces are still a 
factor.131 Per SCCSO’s responses to our survey, investigators assigned to the REACT Task 
Force may not always be able to prioritize cases referred by their home agencies based on 
their responsibility to investigate cases from other jurisdictions. Data from the High 
Technology Theft Apprehension and Prosecution (HTTAP) Program revealed that all five 
regional task forces in California investigated a combined total of 1,312 cyber-related cases 
and conducted a combined total of 1,244 forensic examinations in the 2009–2010 fiscal 
year.132 When considering these five conventional task forces service jurisdictions spanning 
across 29 counties with a combined population of over 31 million and the 34,606 cybercrime 
complaints IC3 recorded for California in 2010, these numbers suggest that only a fraction of 
the cases from the multiple jurisdictions in their regions are being prioritized by the task 
forces.133 A factor to consider when agencies are considering whether to participate in a 
conventional task force is the potential lack of control in how cases from their jurisdiction will 
be prioritized within said task force.  
3. Opportunities 
Opportunities exist to increase the investigative capabilities and capacity of the 
conventional task forces model by providing more cybercrime investigative-related training 
to the local law enforcement agencies within the task forces’ regions of responsibility. Many 
of the cases adding to the workload of regional cybercrime task forces are referred by local 
law enforcement agencies within their region that lack the capabilities or capacity to perform 
any level of cybercrime investigative steps. This scarcity underscores the need for personnel 
from local law enforcement agencies to have the ability to recognize cases that should be 
referred to the task forces for further investigative work but also provide assistance with some 
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of the cybercrime investigative actions.134 Training patrol officers and detectives from local 
law enforcement agencies in how to recognize devices that have digital evidentiary value and 
those that do not helps to reduce the backlog of digital evidence that impacts specialists 
assigned to task forces.135 In 2009, an officer from San Jose Police Department correctly 
identified and seized card skimmers, digital devices used for unlawfully accessing credit card 
numbers, during a traffic stop. The officer’s basic knowledge of digital devices with 
evidentiary value coupled with the simple initial investigative steps conducted led to an 
ongoing investigation by specialists from the REACT Task Force.136 Training first 
responders and investigators from local law enforcement agencies in a conventional task 
force’s region of responsibility serves as a force multiplier for the task forces specialists.  
Providing cybercrime investigative training to personnel from agencies within their 
region should be a goal for every conventional task force. Previous studies involving local 
law enforcement agencies have reiterated the importance of regional cybercrime task forces 
providing more basic cyber-investigative training to local law enforcement agencies.137 
Training other law enforcement agencies in the identification and handling of suspected 
cybercrimes was a key objective for the REACT Task Force, as indicated in a 2009 HTTAP 
Progress Report.138 The continued proliferation of cybercrimes that corresponds with 
technology advances and increased internet connectivity highlight the continued need for task 
forces to prioritize cybercrime training for members of local law enforcement agencies.139 
The research for this study validated the opportunities that exist for the conventional task 
forces model by providing training to personnel from the local law enforcement agencies.  
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4. Threats 
Unlike the internal resources and hybrid task forces models, the conventional task 
forces model is dependent on external funding sources to operate. Conventional task forces 
need steady funding sources to keep up with training needs and for the cost of expensive 
cybercrime investigative software licenses and specialized technology.140 As derived from 
the answers to our survey provided by NC3TF and CATCH, local law enforcement agencies 
that supply these task forces with personnel rely on funding from the task forces in return. A 
2009–2010 HTTAP fiscal year report cited inadequate and decreased state funding for the 
five regional task forces in California as threatening their ability to maintain the cybercrime 
investigative capabilities and capacity necessary to keep up with the ever-evolving 
demands.141 Any decreased funding to the task forces impacts the ability of the task forces to 
provide funding in return to participating agencies. Funding for the costly nature of 
maintaining the necessary resources conventional task forces need for keeping pace with 
cybercrime investigative demands remains an ongoing threat.  
C. HYBRID TASK FORCES  
This section uses open-source information from the literature reviewed, government 
documents, and responses from the questionnaires in Section D of Chapter I to analyze how 
the hybrid task forces model impacts cybercrime investigative capabilities and capacity of 
participating agencies using the SWOT framework. 
1. Strengths 
As compared to internal resources and conventional task forces models, a significant 
strength of participation in the hybrid task forces model is the ability for the agency to 
maintain a high degree of control over case prioritization while also receiving the benefits 
offered by the task forces model. Participating agencies receive some of the same resource 
and training benefits as participating agencies in conventional task forces without 
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compromising accountability to agency-specific hierarchy or the ability to investigative cases 
related to jurisdictional needs.142 The hybrid task forces model provides a force multiplier by 
connecting specialized personnel from different agencies under a common umbrella while 
accounting for the specific jurisdictional investigative needs of participating agencies of 
varying sizes.143 ECTF responses to our survey revealed how participating agencies dictate 
whether their assigned personnel serve the task forces on full-time or part-time basis. 
Moreover, the survey responses highlight how the ECTF provides participating agencies with 
free specialized equipment and training, as well as access to a national network of cybercrime 
experts to help them investigate their own cases. Through our survey, ECTF related how the 
task force has basic expectations on case prioritization based on threat and danger type, 
amount of loss, and significance of community impact.  
UCCTF’s association with OWS provides the SBI Cyber Crimes Unit with similar 
benefits related to training and control over case prioritization as the ECTF hybrid model. In 
addition to free cybercrime training courses, OWS provides UCCTF members hands-on 
training from FBI cybercrime experts with whom they work alongside while investigating 
jurisdictional-specific cases that would not otherwise meet the FBI’s threshold for 
investigation.144 The federal government-sponsored training for members of these hybrid 
task forces relieves the individual agencies of the financial burden associated with sending 
their personnel to the specialized training necessary to be effective in their roles.145 The 
hybrid task forces model provides agencies that would benefit from participating in 
collaborative multijurisdictional efforts an alternative to the conventional task forces model.  
2. Weaknesses  
When compared to the conventional task forces model, the decentralized aspects of 
hybrid task forces are a weakness of the model. The collocation of specialized personnel from 
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multiple law enforcement agencies leads to more interagency cooperation and increased 
learning opportunities.146 Personnel of the hybrid task forces model often work from different 
locations, which is not conducive to the type of hands-on training and mentorship common 
when mixing personnel of varying specialized skill levels into the same workspace.147 The 
decentralized aspects of this model result in a lack of uniformity and less investigative 
coordination.148 The lack of coordination that comes with participating agencies not being 
consolidated as with the conventional task forces model often leads to a duplication of 
effort.149 As indicated in our survey responses from NC3TF and CATCH, uniformed training 
and increased investigative coordination between agencies are two of the perceived benefits 
of the conventional task forces model.  
3. Opportunities  
Opportunities exist for agencies that participate in hybrid task forces to maximize the 
benefits to the agency by spreading some cybercrime investigative responsibilities to 
personnel not assigned to the task forces. Like the conventional task forces model, personnel 
assigned to hybrid task forces face similar workload capacity challenges.150 Allowing hybrid 
task forces members to focus on more complex investigative functions by offsetting less 
complex cyber-related tasks on patrol officers, traditional crimes detectives, and other 
personnel will help in increasing the capacity of task forces personnel and that of their 
respective agencies.151 This capacity can be achieved through ensuring first responders and 
others not assigned to the task forces receive basic levels of cybercrime investigative training. 
As indicated by the responses to our survey, affiliation with ECTF provides participating 
agencies with the opportunity to send personnel to free training provided by the National 
 
146 Wexler, New National Commitment Required, 63; Police Executive Research Forum, The Utah 
Model, 63–64. 
147 Police Executive Research Forum, The Utah Model, 37. 
148 Callagy, “Can Local Police and Sheriff’s Departments Provide a Higher Degree of Homeland 
Security Coordination and Collaboration Through Consolidation of Police Services?,” 3–4. 
149 Callagy, 27. 
150 Goodison, Davis, and Jackson, Digital Evidence and the U.S. Criminal Justice System, 23. 
151 Hinduja, “Computer Crime Investigations in the United States,” 7; Goodison, Davis, and Jackson, 
Digital Evidence and the U.S. Criminal Justice System, 17. 
43 
Computer Forensics Institute (NCFI). The NCFI provides a variety of basic cybercrime 
investigative courses for first responders and other personnel who do not already perform 
specialized cybercrime investigative functions.152 The UCCTF illustrates some of the 
benefits of offsetting workload, which allows their cyber investigators to focus on criminal 
investigations by using digital forensic and cyber intelligence analysts to perform more 
technical investigative functions.153 Providing basic training to and sharing cybercrime 
investigative responsibilities with personnel not assigned to the hybrid task forces presents 
opportunities to maximize the capabilities and capacity of the task forces members.  
4. Threats 
Like the conventional task forces and the internal resources models, agencies 
belonging to hybrid task forces depend on outside funding to maintain their cybercrime 
investigative capabilities and capacity. See Table 3. Agencies of all sizes that participate in 
this model often leverage federal grant funding and other reimbursement funds from the task 
forces fiduciary to acquire and maintain cybercrime investigative equipment and software 
licenses, as well as send personnel to specialized training.154 This type of federal funding can 
be easily cut or diverted to other programs, and the current allocation of grant funding set 
aside for cyber enforcement efforts is inadequate for cybercrime enforcement needs.155 The 
ongoing availability of outside funding sources, such as those from the federal government, 
is uncertain, and the drain on resources required to meet mandates from the funding source 
sometimes outweighs the benefits.156 Recent data from a 2019 study showed how federal 
funding for cybercrime enforcement efforts was inadequate for the changing demands and the 
rapidly advancing nature of technology.157 Most of the participating agencies in the hybrid 
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task forces model lack enough internal funding to cover the ongoing costs of training, 
equipment, and other specialized cybercrime investigative resources if the federal funding 
was diverted or otherwise no longer available.158 Agencies that participate in this type of 
model should have enough internal funding available to offset costs and ensure their ability 
to maintain their cybercrime investigative resources in the future.  
Table 3. SWOT Analysis Matrix. 
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D. CONCLUSION  
When applied to the internal resources, conventional task forces, and hybrid task 
forces models described in this study, the SWOT analysis framework revealed 
commonalities and differences related to their impact on cybercrime investigative 
capabilities and capacity. The analysis was specific to attributes with the biggest impact on 
capabilities and capacity-level of cybercrime investigative training and expertise 
development for personnel, prioritization of cybercrime-related cases, and funding sources. 
Examining these attributes using the SWOT framework was useful in determining the 
impact of the different models on the cybercrime investigative capabilities and capacity of 
local law enforcement agencies.  
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IV. FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSION  
This chapter discusses the main findings of this study and their implications for 
local law enforcement agencies and on future research. It summarizes findings for each of 
the three models and provides recommendations for agencies of varying sizes to consider 
regarding cybercrime investigative capabilities and capacity. The chapter concludes by 
answering the research question that formed the foundation for this thesis: of the three 
models identified in this study—internal resources, conventional task forces, and hybrid 
task forces—which one or combination thereof is best suited for agencies of different sizes?  
A. FINDINGS OF THE ANALYSIS  
The analysis of the three models revealed commonalities and differences between 
them that relate to agencies of different sizes. The findings also revealed that no matter 
what model an agency employs or participates in, they all have relative challenges. The 
results of the analysis are important to local law enforcement decision makers and much 
needed future research in this problem space.  
1. Commonalities between the Models  
The SWOT analysis of three models revealed commonalities between them. As 
illustrated in Chapter III, Table 3, the most prominent commonalities were in the 
opportunities and threats analysis sections. 
a. Opportunities for Cybercrime Investigative Training 
For opportunities, the analysis showed that providing more training to agency 
personnel who do not serve in cybercrime task forces or internal specialized cybercrime 
investigative roles would help increase the overall workload capacity for all three models. 
Ensuring patrol officers have adequate levels of basic cybercrime investigative training 
was a common theme in the research based on their integral role in the initial phases of the 
cybercrime investigative process. Data from a 2013 BJS LEMAS survey reinforced this 
commonality by revealing how trainee officers from a large cross-section of local and state 
law enforcement agencies throughout the nation only received three hours of cybercrime-
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related training in the basic training academy.159 Cybercrime training provides benefits 
ranging from being able to recognize cases that require additional work by cybercrime 
investigative specialists, to helping reduce the backlog cases.160 The information presented 
in this study clearly showed a need for more cybercrime investigative involvement from 
first responders and other personnel not serving in cybercrime investigative roles, as cited 
in the Opportunities section of the analysis for all three models.  
b. Threats Related to Funding 
All three models shared similar threats related to funding. The cost of having 
resources in the form of specially trained personnel and specialized tools was cited in the 
study as a significant expense for individual agencies and task forces alike. The research 
for this study cited a lack of adequate funding as an ongoing challenge for all three models. 
The research also revealed how all three models, to some degree, depended on outside 
funding, such as from the federal government. Studies, such as those cited from PERF in 
2014 and the Third Way in 2019, supported the funding challenges described in the Threats 
section of the analysis for all three models and provided data revealing the ongoing threat 
to internal and external funding sources.161 Decreased funding for cybercrime enforcement 
efforts in California was also cited as a challenge.162 Due to the reliance on government 
funding, challenges associated with the cost of building and maintaining cybercrime 
investigative capabilities will likely continue into the future.  
c. Strengths Related to Case Prioritization 
The internal resources and hybrid task forces models shared similarities associated 
with case prioritization. The research cited in the Strengths section of the analysis for the 
internal resources and hybrid task forces models listed how having flexibility for case 
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prioritization was not only a benefit of participation in both models but important for local 
law enforcement agencies. The importance of agencies having the ability to prioritize cases 
based on jurisdictional needs was highlighted by the research cited throughout the study. 
A cited case study in the Strengths section of the analysis for the internal resources model 
highlighted how a large agency used its ability to prioritize cybercrime investigative 
actions in a high-profile investigation that resulted in timely arrests and subsequent 
criminal prosecution for multiple suspects.163 Although the internal resources model 
differed slightly from the hybrid task forces model by allowing for a greater level of 
autonomy to prioritize cases, the hybrid task forces model allowed for a similar level of 
case prioritization as described in the case study cited previously.  
2. Differences between the Models 
As illustrated in Chapter III, Table 3, prominent differences occurred between the 
three models revealed in the weakness’ category. 
a. Weaknesses Related to Workload with Internal Resources 
Although the research revealed workload challenges as a common thread with all 
the cybercrime investigative efforts, the internal resources model described in this study 
was impacted the most based on increasing demands for cybercrime investigative support 
coupled with a lack of available expertise. The research revealed how most local law 
enforcement agencies did not have enough personnel to keep up with the volume of 
cybercrime investigative needs, which was a reason for participating in multijurisdictional 
task forces models. Data specific only to the internal resources described in this study was 
provided in the Weaknesses section of the analysis showing cybercrime investigative 
workload increases with two large police agencies in Australia and one in the United 
States.164 The study showed that internal resources were more prone to capacity-related 
challenges than conventional and hybrid task forces.  
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b. Weaknesses Related to Case Prioritization with Conventional Task 
Forces 
The analysis exposed how the conventional task forces model when compared to 
the internal resources and hybrid task forces models did not allow participating agencies 
the same level of control over prioritizing cases. The research for this study cited how 
personnel assigned to conventional task forces were beholden to task forces case priorities 
and requests for investigative support from their home agencies were sometimes delayed. 
Data listed in the Weaknesses section of the analysis for the conventional task forces model 
revealed a disproportionately low number of cases being investigated by conventional task 
forces representing multiple agencies in large regions of California.165 The study provides 
areas of concern for the level of prioritization cases received from all the agencies that 
participate in a conventional task forces model. 
c. Weaknesses Related to Decentralization with Hybrid Task Forces 
The analysis highlighted how the decentralized nature of hybrid task forces models 
described in this study was a weakness when compared to the conventional task forces 
model. As listed in the Weaknesses section of the analysis for the hybrid task forces 
models, investigative coordination, ongoing training, and other on-the-job skills 
development opportunities were more inhibited in the hybrid models when compared to 
the collocation of personnel with different skill levels common with conventional task 
forces. The research cited in this study provided evidence for the weaknesses of the hybrid 
task forces models as described. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS  
The following recommendations were formulated based on the findings of this 
study. They are intended to assist decision makers from local law enforcement agencies 
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when developing policies for addressing cybercrime investigative capabilities and 
capacity. The recommendations are grouped by their relevance to different size agencies. 
As defined in this study, small agencies have fewer than 60 officers or serve populations 
of fewer than 60,000, midsize agencies have between 60 and 99 officers or serve 
populations between 60,000 to 99,000, and large agencies have over 99 officers or serve 
populations over 99,000. As was noted in this study, the size of an agency was an important 
consideration when developing policies related to the agency’s cybercrime investigative 
capabilities and capacity. 
1. Small and Midsize Local Law Enforcement Agencies  
Based on the findings from this study, a recommendation for both small and 
midsize agencies to consider regarding their cybercrime investigative capabilities and 
capacity is participation in the hybrid task forces models and limited consolidation. 
a. Participate in Hybrid Task Forces Models 
As listed in the Commonalities between the Models section of the analysis findings, 
the hybrid models described in this study allow for small and midsize agencies with less 
resources to have access to free training and specialized equipment while offering 
flexibility with personnel deployment and case prioritization that thus combine the 
strengths described in the analysis of both the internal and conventional task forces models. 
Of the hybrid models described in this study, ECTF was particularly well suited for small 
and midsize agencies by providing the most flexibility with personnel commitment and 
case prioritization. Three of the eight small and midsize agencies that responded to our 
survey participated in the ECTF and all cited the free training and equipment as important 
benefits.  
b. Consolidate and Share Internal Cybercrime Resources 
Another recommendation for small and midsize agencies to consider is shared 
internal cybercrime investigative resources through limited consolidation or regionalized 
efforts between a small number of jurisdictions in the same area. As listed in the 
Differences between the Models section of the analysis findings, a weakness of the hybrid 
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task forces models was their decentralized nature. Limited consolidation may provide for 
the fusion of strengths from all three models as highlighted in the Analysis Findings 
section. As described in the findings, a weakness of conventional task forces models, as 
compared to strengths of the internal resources and hybrid models was less control over 
case prioritization. Smaller scale regionalization associated with the limited consolidation 
described previously is more likely to mitigate some of the case prioritization challenges 
associated with large regional conventional task forces as described in this study. This type 
of limited regionalization is conducive to the UCCTF hybrid task forces model as described 
in this study but is also compatible with the ECTF hybrid task forces model. This 
recommendation is best suited for small and midsize agencies that have existing mutual 
aid agreements or established cooperative relationships. 
2. Large Local Law Enforcement Agencies  
Based on the findings from this study, a recommendation for large agencies to 
consider regarding their cybercrime investigative capabilities and capacity is having their 
own internal resources combined with participation in the hybrid or conventional task 
forces models. 
a. Combine Internal Resources with Hybrid or Conventional Task Forces 
Models 
The research cited provided confirmation that the jurisdictional needs of large local 
law enforcement agencies combined with the benefits of participation in regionalized 
efforts creates an argument for them having internal resources and for participating in 
multijurisdictional cybercrime task forces models.166 As listed in the Commonalities 
between the Models section of the analysis findings, the common strengths of the internal 
and hybrid task forces models would benefit large agencies that need to be able to prioritize 
cases to control the workload. Furthermore, the different weaknesses of the three models 
described in the differences between the Models section of the analysis findings are likely 
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to be offset by the common strengths described in the Commonalities between the Models 
section of the analysis findings.  
3. Small, Midsize, and Large Local Law Enforcement Agencies 
Based on the findings from this study, a recommendation for all small, midsize, and 
large agencies to consider regarding their cybercrime investigative capabilities and 
capacity is to increase the capabilities and capacity of personnel who do not serve in 
cybercrime investigative roles throughout the agency. 
a. Train to Increase Cybercrime Capabilities for All Agency Personnel 
The practice of housing all an agency’s personnel with cybercrime investigative 
knowhow into a single unit not only reduces the workload capacity of the cybercrime 
investigative specialists, but fails to account for the connection of cybercrimes with other 
traditional crimes.167 As listed in the Commonalities between the Models section of the 
analysis findings, the research cited in the shared opportunities between the models 
established a common argument for providing patrol officers and other personnel basic and 
ongoing cybercrime training.  
C. CONCLUSION  
In answering the research question that established the foundation for this thesis, of 
three common models local law enforcement agencies employ to address cybercrime 
investigative capabilities and capacity (internal resources, conventional task forces, and 
hybrid task forces models), is one or a combination thereof adaptable enough for small, 
midsize, and large agencies? 
A clear argument can be made for hybrid task forces models being the most 
adaptable for achieving some level of cybercrime capabilities and capacity; however, it is 
not a “one size fits all” solution.  
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As the findings of this study clearly showed, arguments can be made for each of 
the models depending on jurisdictional-specific variables of the agencies that employ them. 
It is for these reasons that combinations of the models were cited in the recommendations 
for small and midsize, as well as large local law enforcement agencies.   
To continue to serve and protect their communities effectively, local law 
enforcement agencies must have the ability to address the gamut of ways cybercriminals 
are leveraging technology to victimize people today and into the future. Small, midsize, 
and large agencies are still finding it difficult to overcome challenges associated with 
funding and rigid, non-flexible organizational models that continue to compromise their 
cybercrime capabilities and capacity. Local law enforcement decision makers are currently 
grappling and will continue to grapple with making informed policy decisions related to 
their agencies’ cybercrime investigative capabilities and capacity.  
This study clearly highlighted the need for more research to expand the body of 
work related to the different models available for local law enforcement. Despite the 
prevalence of cybercrime, little in the way of this type of research is related to the current 
strategies local law enforcement agencies are employing to address the need for cybercrime 
investigative capabilities and capacity. Future research into the effectiveness of each model 
that includes more quantitative and qualitative data is recommended. A means for local 
law enforcement decision makers would be provided to make more informed decisions 
about which model would work best for their specific jurisdictional needs.  
The effective distribution of cybercrime investigative knowhow throughout local 
law enforcement agencies and especially among first responders is recommended for future 
research. It was clear from the research for this study that local law enforcement agencies 
need to have personnel trained in how to identify cybercrimes and perform basic 
investigative functions regardless of whether the agency has its own internal cybercrimes 
unit or participates in one of the task forces models. As indicated in this study, it is 
important not only to control the workload of cybercrime investigative specialists, but also 
for increasing the agency’s overall cybercrime investigative capacity. Subsequent research 
should focus on what level of cybercrime investigative training should be provided to both 
new and experienced officers, as well as those serving in special assignments. Additionally, 
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an emphasis should be placed on some level of standardized cybercrime curriculum for law 
enforcement agencies throughout the nation.  
The research for this thesis attempted to determine how three common models local 
law enforcement agencies employ for addressing cybercrime investigative capabilities and 
capacity are at serving their intended purpose. This thesis adds to the body of knowledge 
about the strategies being used by local law enforcement agencies to increase their ability 
to address the growing problem of cyber-related crimes.  
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